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Author
Słomka-Gołębiowska Agnieszka (Szkoła Główna Handlowa w Warszawie)
Title
Oddzielenie własności od kontroli, czyli o istocie ładu korporacyjnego
Separation of Ownership from Control Or the Essence of Corporate Governance
Source
Ekonomia i Prawo, 2008, t. 4, s. 131-148
Issue title
Własność i kontrola w teorii i praktyce. Cz. 2
Keyword
Ład korporacyjny, Spółki akcyjne, Własność w gospodarce, Kontrola
Corporate governance, Joint stock companies, Ownership in economy, Control
Note
summ.
Abstract
Celem artykułu jest przeanalizowanie sposobów ograniczania kosztów oddzielenia własności od kontroli w przedsiębiorstwie, poprzez efektywnie działające instytucje ładu korporacyjnego. Zalicza się do nich regulacje prawne oraz mechanizmy rynkowe, takie jak: konkurencja na rynku produktów i czynników produkcji, w szczególności na rynku kapitałowym i na rynku pracy dla menedżerów, rynek przejęć, system wynagrodzeń dla menedżerów oraz bezpośredni nadzór nad spółką sprawowany przez radę nadzorczą. Artykuł rozpoczyna się od wyjaśnienie pojęcia "oddzielenie własności od kontroli" w dużych przedsiębiorstwach. Następnie wskazano przyczyny występowania tego zjawiska w życiu gospodarczym. W dalszej części artykułu przedstawiono potencjalne koszty oddzielenia własności od kontroli w przedsiębiorstwach. Najwięcej uwagi poświęcono omówieniu sposobów ich ograniczenia, czyli istocie ładu korporacyjnego. (fragment tekstu)

The separation of ownership and control is the phenomenon associated with joint-stock companies, particularly publicly held, in which shareholders possess little or no direct control over management decisions. Due to the diffusion of ownership shareholders transfer most of their control rights to managers that specialize in the day-to-day management of the company. Managers may be tempted to act in their own interests because of information asymmetries between them and shareholders. The separation of ownership and control permits larger size of organizations and hierarchical decision making. It also enables investors to limit financial risk by diversifying and withdrawing capital as the market conditions change. The separation of ownership and control brings not only benefits, but also costs. These costs are mitigated by number of corporate governance institutions that reduce information asymmetries by solving adverse selection and moral hazard as well as give managers incentives to act in shareholders' interests. They embrace competition on product and factor markets, including capital markets and the market for corporate control, managerial financial incentives and supervisory board. They are complementary to each other. (original abstract)
Accessibility
The Main Library of the Cracow University of Economics
The Library of Warsaw School of Economics
The Library of University of Economics in Katowice
The Main Library of Poznań University of Economics and Business
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ISSN
1898-2255
Language
pol
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