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Author
Jakubowski Rafał M. (Akademia Ekonomiczna we Wrocławiu), Kuśmierczyk Paweł (Akademia Ekonomiczna we Wrocławiu)
Title
Wytwarzanie dóbr publicznych a problem "jazdy na gapę"
Production of Public Goods and the Free-Riding Problem
Source
Ekonomia i Prawo, 2007, t. 3, s. 163-184
Issue title
Własność i kontrola w teorii i praktyce. Cz. 1
Keyword
Dobra publiczne, Ekonomia neoklasyczna, Badania empiryczne, Finansowanie dóbr publicznych
Public goods, Neoclassical economy, Empirical researches, Financing of public goods
Note
summ.
Abstract
Zjawisko "jazdy na gapę" (ang. free riding) skupia uwagę ekonomistów, ponieważ jego występowanie prowadzi do istotnych błędów w optymalizacyjnym działaniu koordynacji rynkowej w zakresie wytwarzania i alokacji dóbr publicznych. Zjawisko to może być poważnym problemem gospodarczym, szereg dóbr publicznych ma bowiem kluczowe znaczenie dla dobrobytu społecznego. (fragment tekstu)

The free-riding phenomenon is of utmost importance to the economists as its occurrence makes it difficult for the markets to produce and allocate public goods effectively. It is especially significant in the case of non-exclusive goods, i.e. in the example where it is impossible or very costly to exclude anybody from consuming the given good. The intensity of free-riding leads to the problems in financing the public goods and makes it often necessary to introduce some costly systems of control. The paper presents the main results of studies dedicated to the economic significance of the free-riding phenomenon. These include both the theoretical (different systems of financing the public projects, different institutional solutions of managing the public goods) and empirical (the results of the experiments) studies. (original abstract)
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ISSN
1898-2255
Language
pol
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